We employ new data on international mutual and hedge funds to identify the cross-border transmission of funding shocks. Shocks to investor ‡ows experienced by developed countrydomiciled mutual and hedge funds translate into changes in their portfolio allocations in emerging markets. These portfolio allocation shifts signi…cantly impact emerging market equity returns and are associated with elevated covariances between emerging and developed markets. Our results constitute new evidence on the sources and magnitude of …nancial contagion e¤ects, an important topic in the theoretical and empirical international …nance literature. 
Introduction
An important new strand of the literature in …nancial economics shows that asset market liquidity can be signi…cantly a¤ected by the funding available to intermediaries (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2009) ). In a recent paper, Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) present evidence that this channel is empirically important for price determination in U.S. stocks. Their methodology relies on the insight that mutual funds and hedge funds are often forced to redeem investments as a consequence of funding shocks that originate from their investor base. Using data on fund in ‡ows and out ‡ows in combination with mandatory disclosures of fund holdings, they …nd that when such forced redemptions (or '…re sales') are correlated across institutions that hold a particular stock, they cause the price of the stock to fall signi…cantly. While temporary, these price e¤ects last on average for long periods of time (several months or a year) until capital ‡ows back into the assets, alleviating the funding-generated pressure.
Our contribution in this paper is to show that this line of reasoning yields a rich set of …ndings with important implications for the debate surrounding "contagion,"the term given to the transmission of shocks between country …nancial markets, over and above any links between the underlying fundamentals of the economies. While a large body of literature in …nance and economics has been devoted to understanding contagion, 1 there is an ongoing discussion in the literature about the sources of contagion, and much debate on the magnitude of the impacts of contagion on emerging economies in particular. We …nd that the funding shocks experienced by a large set of developed country-domiciled funds are transmitted to twenty …ve emerging markets around the world through the forced portfolio reallocations of these funds, with important impacts on the average stock returns of the emerging markets. Perhaps more importantly, we also …nd that at times when emerging stock markets are predominately owned by funds most subject to funding shocks, they also have signi…cantly elevated correlations with G-7 stock markets. This …nding helps to provide evidence on the sources of the transmission of shocks across borders that has hitherto been inferred in the literature either indirectly (see Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006) ), or cleverly extrapolated from the 1 See Kodres and Pritsker (2002) for a model that generates contagion through cross-market rebalancing. Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Yuan (2005) show that wealth-constrained investors who lose money may need to liquidate positions in multiple countries, thereby spreading crisis from one country to others. For empirical work, see Longin and Solnik (2001) , Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , Forbes (2004) , and Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2006) . behaviour of a small sample of investment managers (see Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004) ).
To conduct our investigation, we employ a new data source from Emerging Portfolio Flow Research (EPFR) on the monthly capital ‡ows to, and country-allocations of, global investment managers that invest in emerging markets. These data cover over a thousand funds that collectively hold on average 3% (and at maximum, 9%) of the capitalization of the emerging markets in our sample. The funds are overwhelmingly domiciled in developed markets (the U.S. and Europe). Using these data, we investigate the forced trading behavior of those international mutual and hedge funds that are …nancially distressed on account of signi…cant redemptions of capital by their investors. In the absence of a su¢ ciently large cash bu¤er, we …nd that these …nancial intermediaries change their portfolio allocations to the markets in which they invest in response to funding shocks from their investor base. These changes are economically and statistically signi…cant: funds in the bottom decile (which experience signi…cant out ‡ows) reduce or eliminate their holdings in approximately 80% of the markets in which they invest over the month following the out ‡ows. This can be compared to the funds in the top decile, which experience signi…cant in ‡ows, and reduce or eliminate just 21% of their positions over the next month. Similarly funds in the top decile expand their holdings in 79% of the markets in which they invest, while those experiencing signi…cant out ‡ows expand just 22% of their positions. Our next step is to connect these …re sale changes in global funds' portfolio allocations to emerging market stock returns. To do so, we construct a measure of emerging market capital that is 'At-Risk.' Speci…cally, we …rst take the product of the dollars allocated by each fund in the EPFR data to each emerging market with the ‡ow experienced by the fund. We then aggregate the measure across all funds in the sample to obtain total dollars 'At-Risk,'and then normalize the measure in various ways. The measure captures the amount of capital that a particular emerging market could see enter or exit as a result of the in ‡ows and out ‡ows faced by invested funds.
When we sort emerging country-months by capital At-Risk, we …nd that the country-months in the top quintile of At-Risk outperform those in the bottom quintile by 128 basis points per month on average, or 15.4% on an annualized basis. When we construct a calendar time portfolio that is long the top quintile of At-Risk countries and short the bottom quintile of At-Risk countries, the alpha of the portfolio is virtually unchanged when evaluated using the world market risk-premium as the systematic risk factor. This large and signi…cant di¤erence between the negative and positive At-Risk country-months suggests that the …re sale changes in allocations by intermediaries subject to funding pressure have signi…cant impacts on the prices of the markets in which the forced trading occurs. 2 Finally, we …nd that the …re-sale actions of global funds increase the correlation between the returns of the emerging stock markets most subject to this source of pressure and the returns of the developed markets from which the funding shocks emanate. When we allow for betas to vary conditional on the sign of the world market risk-premium, the alpha is eliminated. In the face of positive (negative) world market returns, countries with positive (negative) At-Risk capital have signi…cantly larger world market betas than do countries with negative (positive) At-Risk capital. 3 Our explanation for this echoes Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006) : when stock returns in developed markets are low, investors face margin calls that result in the liquidation of foreign investments, including those undertaken through global funds. This means that out ‡ows will be greater at such times of low developed market returns, resulting in more pressure for forced liquidations by global funds. As a result, the correlation of stock returns between developed markets and the emerging markets held most by funds subject to this source of pressure will increase. The reverse of this argument applies when developed market stock returns are positive, generating higher return correlations between positive At-Risk countries and developed markets.
To con…rm our intuition, we conduct several robustness checks. First, we re-estimate the speci…cation using the returns on a portfolio of the G-7 countries in place of the world market returns, and …nd virtually unchanged results. Second, we implement the regression for portfolios sorted by our At-Risk measure created using predicted (rather than realized) ‡ows, and continue to …nd the asymmetry in betas. Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by a conditional bias in the correlation estimate, potentially induced by splitting the data according to the realized returns (Forbes and Rigobon (2002) ), we also estimate a regime-switching model in which we allow the mean and variance of the world market return to vary across regimes. When we re-estimate the portfolio betas, allowing them to di¤er across regimes, the documented results remain unchanged.
In sum, the …nding that there are increased (and asymmetric) correlations between developed markets and the emerging markets most held by distressed intermediaries constitutes robust evidence of an important transmission mechanism underlying contagion.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed in the study.
Section 3 relates the variation in the capital ‡ows experienced by global funds to their investment behaviour. Section 4 connects the forced reallocations of global funds with underlying emerging market stock returns, and Section 5 concludes.
Data
We use two main sources of data: (i) data on international mutual and hedge funds from Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) and (ii) country index return, market capitalization, and trading volume data from Standard and Poor's Emerging Markets Database (EMDB) and the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database. The EPFR data covers globally-focused funds, domiciled in the US and Europe, that invest in equity and bond markets in over 90 industrialized and emerging countries around the world. The speci…ed …elds provided, for each fund and each month are: the total net asset value (T N A) of the fund, the return of the fund, the in ‡ow or out ‡ow from the fund, and the percentage of the fund's assets that are allocated to each country. The sample period spans February 1996 to October 2008. 4 There are 1,520 unique funds during the sample period, although the number of funds present on any given month ‡uctuates as funds are born or die. At the end of 2007, for example, the sample contains 938 funds with US$ 943,589 million worth of assets under management. On average, the funds in the sample collectively hold approximately 2 percent of country equity market capitalization across all the 90 (emerging and developed) countries .
To investigate the reliability of the EPFR data, we compare the T N As and monthly returns of a subsample of funds to those in the CRSP mutual fund data. We match the two data sets by fund name, using a scoring system that measures the proportion of common letters in the fund names, and pick funds with a score of 70% or greater on this metric. 5 We then carefully screen out incorrect matches by hand (see details in Appendix A). This process yields 126 funds that appear 4 The data for January 2000 is missing for all funds. 5 We thank Joey Engleberg for the name-matching program that we use in this paper.
in both data sets (a little less than 10% of the sample used in this study). Figure 1 plots the T N As and monthly returns from EPFR and CRSP mutual fund data sets against one another, and shows that they line up very well. Almost all observations lie on the 45-degree line. In the few cases where we have discrepancies, one of the two datasets does not capture all the available share classes (which then subsequently come on line, occasionally with a several month lag). This yields minor di¤erences in T N A, despite returns being roughly equal.
As we are interested in the behavior of both the ‡ows to funds (i.e., the behavior of the investors in the funds) as well as the behavior of the funds themselves, we conduct a preliminary investigation with the purpose of identifying the location of the ownership base of the funds. The …rst step in this process is presented in the …gures in the Appendix, which document the location of domicile of the funds in the sample. The …gures show that the funds are primarily domiciled in developed market jurisdictions: at the end of 1997, for example, 85% of the funds are domiciled in Ireland, Luxembourg, the U.K. or the U.S., with the lion's share (63%) in the U.S. By the end of 2007, the fraction for these four domiciles is unchanged, remaining at 85%, but with some of the share of funds moving from the U.S. (46%) o¤shore to Luxembourg (27%). The substantial fraction of funds in the data domiciled in the developed markets, and especially onshore in the U.K. and the U.S. suggests that the investor base of the funds in the sample is predominately located in the developed markets.
Second, we compare the data at the country level to data on the net foreign transactions of U.S.
investors reported in the Treasury International Capital System (TIC). We …rst compute the active changes in dollar holdings across all EPFR funds in each country as the aggregate dollar holding of the EPFR funds at the end of the month in the country less the dollar holding at the end of the previous month multiplied by the gross country index return (i.e., the expected dollar holding if all funds follow the buy and hold strategy). We then standardize the active change in dollar holdings by dividing it by the end-of-prior-month country index market capitalization, and cumulate this percentage from the beginning of the sample period in each country, to get an idea of the evolution of EPFR-fund ownership in the country. We follow essentially the same procedure with the TIC data, cumulating and standardizing the net transactions of U.S. investors, and plot the EPFR series against the TIC series. (For the purposes of visual inspection, we subtract means and divide by standard deviations to plot the two series on the same scale.) Figure 2 shows the results of this exercise for Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, and Russia. The EPFR and TIC cumulative ownership changes move together closely for all four countries: on a month-to-month non-cumulative basis, the cross-country average correlations between the EPFR and TIC ownership change series are 20% for emerging countries. 6 In terms of size, at the end of 2007, funds in the EPFR sample collectively hold 3.73 percent of an average emerging country's total market capitalization. The same statistic is 9.95 percent for all U.S. investors as captured by TIC. These statistics appear to verify the conjecture arising from the funds'reported domiciles -that a signi…cant fraction of the investor base is located in the U.S. (comparable statistics to TIC are not available for Europe).
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we screen the EPFR fund data in a few standard ways. First, given our focus on fund ‡ows and stock returns in emerging markets, we keep only the funds that invest in at least one emerging country (under the current MSCI classi…cation) during the sample period. 7 Second, to avoid data errors, we only include funds once their T N As hit the US$ 5 million threshold. Third, in the early part of the sample, we …nd that several funds have a series of zero returns that persist for a few months. During these months, changes in T N A are all lumped into fund ‡ows by construction which clearly generates data errors, so we exclude them.
Collectively, these exclusions have almost no impact on our analysis as the excluded funds have negligible dollar holdings and ‡ows compared to the rest of the sample, but they reduce the number of unique funds in our sample to a total of 1,097. Finally, we winsorize fund ‡ows and returns at the -50% and +200% points in order to minimize the in ‡uence of potential outliers. This procedure a¤ects less than 1% of the sample. Table I reports the descriptive statistics of the EPFR sample by country. The average number of funds investing in each country is as small as 32 for Jordan, and as large as 646 for Hong Kong, and as mentioned before, the funds hold a signi…cant proportion of country market capitalization (3.02% on average across the emerging countries). This percentage holding does not vary much over time (with time-series standard deviation less than half of the mean) but varies signi…cantly across countries, ranging from 0.11 percent in Jordan to 9.22 percent in Hungary. This variation is useful in helping us distinguish the e¤ects of fund ‡ows from those of fund holdings in general. 6 Note that the standardization for plotting purposes masks the fact that the TIC ‡ows for Hong Kong are much bigger in magnitude than the active changes in dollar holdings from the EPFR data. For Russia, however, the opposite holds. These di¤erences can be attributed to the inclusion of European-domiciled funds in the EPFR data, and the potentially far broader coverage of US investors in the TIC data. 7 We exclude Zimbabwe from the list due to its extremely high in ‡ation.
To broadly examine whether funds chase returns and whether fund behavior impacts stock prices, we also calculate the time-series correlations between the active change in dollar holdings, measured as a percentage of the country's market capitalization, and country index returns. The average contemporaneous correlation is 7%, statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. In nineteen of the twenty …ve sample countries, this correlation is positive. The average correlation between the active change in holdings and the lagged country index return is also 7%, and statistically signi…cant.
This suggests that funds tend to increase holdings in the countries that recently experience high returns. Finally, the average correlation between the lagged active change in holdings and the country index return is 4%, and again statistically signi…cant. This positive correlation, along with the positive contemporaneous correlation, suggests that funds' trading may impact prices both immediately and with some lag.
In Table II As for fund ‡ows, measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month T N A, the mean and median are close to zero. The 1st and 99th percentiles of ‡ows are -24.28 percent and 31.70 percent, respectively, indicating that ‡ows are highly variable. This variation is useful in identifying funds and countries that are likely to experience …nancial pressure. In all, the characteristics of global funds that invest in emerging markets are broadly in line with the evidence presented elsewhere in the literature for other funds, and the EPFR data do not appear to be di¤erent from other common data sources along these dimensions.
3. Fund ‡ows and fund behavior
Flows and performance
Our goal is to understand how the funding of managed investment vehicles impacts their allocation decisions, and consequently the stock returns of the markets in which they invest. A necessary …rst step in this exercise is to decompose the variation in funding into expected and unexpected components. This decomposition will allow us to separately evaluate the distinct roles that are played by shocks to funding versus movements in funding that can be anticipated. To e¤ect this decomposition, we rely on the vast literature that documents a link between capital ‡ows to managed funds and their past performance (see, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Writing f low j;t for the capital ‡ows of a sample fund j in a month t and R j;t for its return in the same month, our model for ‡ows is:
We estimate the model in two ways, …rst, as a pooled regression across all funds and time periods, and second, using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) , where we estimate a cross-sectional regression for each month in the sample and then calculate the time-series average of the coe¢ cients and the t-statistics using the time-series standard error of the mean. relation between future fund ‡ows and both lagged ‡ows and lagged returns. Speci…cally, monthly ‡ows are signi…cantly predicted by lagged ‡ows through the …rst year. While lagged returns also predict future ‡ows, the e¤ect is less pronounced as it appears to be limited to the most recent quarter. Second, the results are broadly comparable across both the pooled and Fama-MacBeth regressions, but the reported R 2 is naturally smaller in the former case as it re ‡ects both crosssectional and time-series variation in fund ‡ows. Finally, the results are also largely in line with previous research insofar as they suggest signi…cant predictability in fund ‡ows; however, we should point out that the reported R 2 , 27% in the Fama-MacBeth regression, is somewhat smaller than that which is generally reported elsewhere. The ‡ow-performance relationship is less pronounced for funds investing in emerging equity markets.
Finally, given the …tted values implied by the time-series average of the coe¢ cients from the estimated Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table III , we measure expected fund ‡ows for each fund at each point in time. We will report various features of expected ‡ows implied by this regression below.
Fund ‡ows and re-allocation
Our next step is to discover the extent to which movements in fund ‡ows impact funds'allocation decisions and investment behavior. To the extent that fund in ‡ows and out ‡ows put pressure on fund managers to re-allocate, sorting funds along this dimension may help highlight the particular instances in which forced selling (or buying) is taking place.
As a start, we sort fund-month observations into deciles according to fund ‡ows and document the characteristics of the fund-months in each decile. Table IV provides average fund characteristics across di¤erent groups of funds sorted by realized monthly ‡ow, where reported statistics are the means for each variable across all fund-months in each decile. The …rst column of the table presents a simple reiteration of the fact that the funds in our sample indeed experience signi…cant di¤erences in realized ‡ow, with the extreme deciles facing a range of 13.6% (top decile) to -12.6%
(bottom) monthly ‡ows as a percentage of assets under management. While this spread is notable, it obtains by construction since this is the exact dimension along which we are sorting. That said, a portion of this di¤erence is associated with predictable expected ‡ows, as constructed in the previous subsection. The second column of Table IV shows that the top and bottom deciles of realized- ‡ow-sorted funds were expected to experience ‡ows of 0.9% and -1.7%, on average, respectively. (We later revisit the e¤ects associated with realized and expected ‡ows.) The third column of the table shows that funds experiencing the largest in ‡ows (out ‡ows) also experienced the highest (smallest) prior investment returns, consistent with the evidence in the literature that fund ‡ows are to some extent linked to past performance, and the motivating factor behind speci…cation (3.1). Finally, two additional observations about the fund characteristics are worth highlighting. The fourth column of Table IV shows that consistent with the …ndings of Warther (1995) and Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) , funds in the top decile hold, on average, considerably more cash than those in the bottom.
As the sharp di¤erences in cash holdings likely imply some variability in a fund's ability to manage investor ‡ows, we will explore the link between ‡ows, forced re-allocation, and cash holdings in more detail below. Also, the …fth column of Table IV shows that the funds that appear in the extreme ‡ow deciles have relatively fewer country holdings than the average fund; hence, extreme ‡ows in either direction may induce relatively elevated market impact at the country level if funds in those deciles indeed maintain their focused country allocations. Finally, we describe the market capitalization and trading volume of the markets in which the funds are investing. While there are no signi…cant di¤erences in these characteristics across ‡ow deciles, the funds in the EPFR sample are, on average, investing in slightly larger and more liquid markets than the median market.
For fund ‡ows to generate pressure on the equity markets in which the funds are invested, the funds experiencing the ‡ows must adjust their equity positions in response to the ‡ow-exerted pressure. To see whether this is the case, we sort fund-month observations into deciles according to fund ‡ows and calculate the average proportions of countries in which the funds in each decile increase, decrease, or eliminate their holdings. Table V presents evidence on the degree to which funds re-allocate their holdings in the face of signi…cant realized (panel A) and expected (panel B) ‡ows. We begin with an examination of the behavior of funds around periods of extreme realized ‡ows. The …rst column of the table, concerning realized fund ‡ows, is identical to the previous panel to reinforce that this sort is identical to that presented above in Table IV . In the second through fourth columns of Table V , we present a summary of the country allocations that funds in each decile are, on average, expanding, reducing, or eliminating. Before proceeding, the manner in which we measure position changes requires some explanation. As mentioned above, we observe the fund's USD allocation for each country in each month. For each fund-country-month, we compare the USD allocation at the end of the month to the value that would be implied by grossing up the holding using the relevant USD index return for the country given the beginning of month USD allocation.
If the actual value is greater (less) than this constructed buy-and-hold benchmark, we say the fund has expanded (reduced) its position; if the USD value is zero, we say the position was eliminated. Table V demonstrates that the average magnitude of the change in risky positions also exhibits sharp di¤erences across realized fund ‡ow deciles -a movement from extreme in ‡ows to extreme out ‡ows is on average associated with a 0.38% decrease in the allocation to the average country in the portfolio. The …nal column of the table highlights that cash balances also expand (shrink) for funds that exhibit large in ‡ows (out ‡ows). In sum, it appears that global funds do signi…cantly re-allocate their exposures in emerging markets in the face of investor redemptions and subscriptions. In the next section, we will explore whether this forced re-allocation also a¤ects emerging market returns, and provides a channel through which global market shocks may be transmitted to emerging markets.
Before moving to this next step, we examine the extent to which re-allocation decisions are linked to variation in expected ‡ows, with the view that such predictability could allow global funds to anticipate and hence manage their activities on the margin. However, if we were to observe comparable variation in re-allocation patterns in the face of expected and realized fund ‡ows, this would suggest that funds face constraints inhibiting them from making adjustments to cushion the e¤ect of movements in ‡ows. Consequently, global funds could collectively act as a mechanism for the transmission of …nancial shocks across borders even if they can anticipate funding pressure.
Panel B of Table V The net change in positions is measured as the proportion of countries in which the fund increases its holdings minus those in which the fund reduces or eliminate its holdings. Taken together, the behavior of funds that are expected to experience signi…cant ‡ows is partially predictable. The only notable exception is presented in the …nal column of Table V Panel B, where we show that funds do not experience signi…cant di¤erences in the change in cash balances across expected ‡ow deciles. This is in contrast to the sizeable di¤erence in cash changes related to (largely unexpected) realized ‡ow, and may be a re ‡ection of the degree to which funds can better manage anticipated ‡ows.
4. Flow-induced pressure and equity prices in emerging markets 4.1. Capital "At-Risk"
In the previous section, we discovered that global funds experiencing in ‡ows (out ‡ows) are prone to expanding (reducing or eliminating) their emerging market allocations. This naturally leads to the conjecture that these forced '…re-sale'reallocations impact prices, since signi…cant discounts are likely to result from these demands for instant liquidity. Of course, the price pressure that forced reallocations are likely to generate in a given country's stock market depends on (i) how much of the market is held by the funds (since liquidating larger stakes will naturally result in larger discounts) and (ii) the aggregate ‡ows that these funds experience (which index the extent of forced redemptions or purchases by the funds). Accordingly, we propose a new measure that re ‡ects the proportion of a country's market capitalization that is 'At-Risk' of forced selling or buying. Speci…cally, for country k in month t (and with the usual notation that j denotes funds),
USD At-Risk is measured as:
where f low j;t = f low j;t + f low j;t 1 + f low j;t 2 , is the sum of capital ‡ows experienced by a fund j over the quarter prior to and including month t, and allocation j;k;t 1 is the percent of fund j's Thus, the only source of contemporaneous variation in At-Risk is the ‡ow experienced by funds invested in the country.
To ascertain the impact of being 'At-Risk' on an emerging market, we compute At-Risk for each of the countries each month, and then sort the country-months into quintiles. and 3.4% of average monthly trading volume (in absolute terms), respectively. These signi…cant 10 We use ‡ows over the previous quarter in order to alleviate concerns about any potential measurement error as well as to acknowledge that the funds may face increasing pressure based on ‡ows experienced over several months.
fractions of trading volume suggest that any forced trading induced by ‡ow shocks could have important e¤ect on prices, especially in light of the evidence that emerging markets are plagued by illiquidity and high transaction costs (see Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007)). The third column of Table VI shows that the countries in the extreme quintiles (1 and 5) represent a signi…cantly larger share of the capital invested by the funds in our sample than those in the intermediate quintiles. This is an important by-product of the construction of the At-Risk measure: to have signi…cant capital At-Risk, the country of necessity will represent a signi…cant fraction of global funds'allocations. This automatically reduces concerns that the extreme At-Risk countries are unusual in the sense that they impose investment restrictions, and the attendant concern that any return patterns associated with being At-Risk are a product of such restrictions.
However it does raise the concern that any patterns we discover stem from elevated allocations to (2008)). Consequently, when we explore how being 'At-Risk'relates to emerging market price determination, we will compare our measure with an alternative based solely on funds' aggregate holdings unrelated to their capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Finally, the fourth and …fth columns of Table VI compare our measure of At-Risk capital to a similar sort variable …rst proposed by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) . This variable, P RESSU RE_2, is closely related to At-Risk, but di¤erent insofar as P RESSU RE_2 measures funds' actual (rather than potential) trading activity in the face of signi…cant in ‡ows or out ‡ows (i.e., it replaces allocation j;k;t 1 with allocation j;k;t in equation (4.1) above). To measure changes in fund allocations using the EPFR data, we take the di¤erence between observed allocations and those that would result if funds were following a buy-and-hold strategy. Indeed our results in Table V employ this method, and we could easily use these measures of active changes to construct P RESSU RE_2.
While the use of this method seems reasonable when the goal is to evaluate fund behavior in response to movements in ‡ows (as in Table V) , when analyzing the impacts on underlying country prices and returns, we wish to be more careful. Our approach is to avoid any possible contamination that may result from sorting countries using a measure of active changes that employs contemporaneous returns in its construction. Consequently, we prefer our At-Risk measure to P RESSU RE_2, and employ it in all our analyses of country returns. 11 Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison, we forge ahead and compute P RESSU RE_2, again scaling the quantity either by trading volume or market capitalization. The statistically signi…cant di¤erences in both versions of P RESSU RE_2
(scaled by volume in the fourth column and market capitalization in the …fth column of Table VII reports the time-series mean and standard deviation of each At-Risk quintile portfolio both for the entire sample period and conditional on the contemporaneously realized world market excess return.
In Table V we documented that global funds, on average, re-allocate their investment positions in the face of sizeable subscriptions or redemptions. We also showed in Table VI that To verify that developed market returns are indeed the source of this pressure, Table VIII reestimates the conditional relationship using the return on a portfolio of G-7 countries in place of the world market return. Exactly the same pattern emerges again, suggesting that our posited mechanism is indeed the one in operation (to con…rm this, we subsequently explore the implications of this disparity for world market betas of a calendar time portfolio). A note on identi…cation is in order here: while it is true that we do not have explicit information about the nationality of the investors that invest in the funds in our sample, our explanation of the asymmetric conditional correlation relies on several important facts. First, the funds in our sample are overwhelmingly domiciled either in the U.S. or in Europe, leading to the presumption that their investor base is most likely from these economies. Second, we …nd that the aggregated EPFR ‡ows track the U.S. Treasury-recorded net asset ‡ows of U.S. investors quite well over time, as documented in the Data section. Third, the asymmetry in the correlations that we document here and elsewhere in the paper are just as pronounced when we use the G-7 risk premium in place of the world risk-premium, lending credence to our posited mechanism.
Since At-Risk is a product of both the funds'collective holding in the country as well as the ‡ows the funds face, it is interesting to see whether it is really the pressure created by fund ‡ows that explains the patterns in Panel A of Table VII and Table VIII between the portfolios at the two extremes when sorted by holdings. The pattern we observe in the …rst column of Panel A suggests that both holdings and fund ‡ows are required to observe return e¤ects from potential forced trading. That said, countries that are held in larger proportion by global funds (Quintile 1) appear to have higher betas -they disproportionately gain or lose more when the contemporaneous world market excess return is positive or negative, respectively. These di¤erences are highly signi…cant, with t-statistics exceeding 4. This suggests that some portion of the beta e¤ects documented in Table VII may be driven by the holdings -although it is worth noting that the bottom quintile of At-Risk sorted portfolios have higher downside betas than the top quintile of At-Risk sorted portfolios despite the fact that the countries in the latter are signi…cantly more highly held than the those in the former (see the third column of Table VI) . Finally, we also …nd that countries which are most highly held by global funds are signi…cantly more volatile.
Calendar time portfolios
To understand the economic source of return di¤erences, we examine the returns of a calendartime portfolio strategy formed by going long the highest At-Risk quintile portfolio and going short the lowest At-Risk quintile portfolio. Given the exposures to the world market portfolio return documented above, we focus on the world CAPM as a benchmark, but in some speci…cations we use the G-7 portfolio return as an additional control. Speci…cally, we regress our long-short portfolio returns on the world market risk premium, and we also estimate a conditional version of the model in which we allow the loading on the world market portfolio return to di¤er between periods in which the world-market return is positive and negative. The …rst two columns of Table IX world market betas (in absolute terms) than do countries with positive At-Risk capital. Our explanation for this is the same as that mentioned in the previous section, and again we re-estimate the speci…cation using the G-7 returns in place of the world market returns in Table IX Panel B. The results are virtually the same, suggesting that our proposed transmission mechanism applies.
Because our At-Risk portfolio sort involves contemporaneous fund ‡ow information, the alpha of 128 basis points per month in Table VIII is not indicative of a tradeable strategy, rather it simply speaks to the e¤ects that unexpected forced buying or selling by global funds have on price determination in emerging markets. That said, we also document above that global fund ‡ows are to some degree predictable, and funds appear to re-allocate even in the face of predicted ‡ows. To explore the price e¤ects of predicted ‡ows (and thereby the implementability of the trading strategy),
we also sort countries according to predicted At-Risk, calculated by substituting the expected ‡ow (E[f low j;t ]) based on the model in (3.1) for f low j;t in (4.1). Comparable world CAPM regression results are presented in the last two columns of Table IX . As can be seen, the alpha in column III is no longer statistically signi…cant, so it appears that much of the price e¤ect in the …rst column of Table IX is associated with the more pronounced forced buying and selling generated by unanticipated funding shocks. This echoes our …nding in Table V Panel B that the observed level of fund re-allocation in the face of expected ‡ow variation is signi…cant but less pronounced.
However, in the fourth column of Table IX , the conditional version of the world CAPM does yield signi…cant and similar evidence regarding the di¤erent conditional betas of the long-short portfolio based on positive or negative world market (or G-7) returns. In other words, expected ‡ow is useful in predicting betas, although the strategy of providing liquidity to markets based on expected ‡ow
is not likely to be pro…table. with the long-short portfolio of countries sorted according to the funds'holding as a percentage of the country's market capitalization, rather than by At-Risk. These results are reported in Table X , and con…rm that it is the combination of high holdings and pressure from fund in ‡ows and out ‡ows that generates the return patterns and changing conditional betas. Holdings alone are not su¢ cient to infer these e¤ects.
Global regimes
Several papers …nd that market correlations vary over time, and are generally higher during bear markets than during bull markets (see Longin and Solnik (2001) To make sure that this source of bias does not a¤ect our results, we follow Boyer, Kumagai, 12 If realized country-level returns or volatility vary systematically with fund ‡ows, our conditional beta estimates for the At-Risk portfolio could also be subject to bias arising from this source. While possible, this is unlikely for two reasons. First, our At-Risk measure is constructed by using the cross-sectional variation in ‡ows, and changes in this cross-sectional distribution over time (rather than the systematic time-varying component of ‡ows). Second, as Table VII shows, neither the unconditional or conditional variance di¤er signi…cantly across At-Risk quintile portfolios (despite the fact that volatility is, on average, higher during global market downturns consistent with the usual leverage e¤ect argument (see Black (1976) ).
and Yuan (2006) and estimate a regime-switching model, in which both mean returns and variances of return are allowed to vary across regimes. Conditional on being in state s, at time t the world market risk premium R W;t is assumed to be normally distributed:
where the unobserved state variable in our model, s t , can take on one of the two values, s t 2 f1; 2g.
Letting t represent all available information through time t, the state variable s t is assumed to follow a two-state Markov process:
resulting in a 2 2 transition matrix. This results in 6 parameters to be estimated, namely where " N (0; 2 ). This requires another 4 parameters to be estimated, namely ; 1 ; 2 ; and 2 .
Our estimation of the total of 10 parameters therefore proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate parameters in equations (4.3) and (4.2) by maximum likelihood, using only the world market premium to identify regimes. We then use the …rst-step parameter estimates and the posterior regime probabilities to estimate parameters of (4.4). Table XI reports Table IX . 13 We also perform a Wald test of the null hypothesis that betas are the same in both regimes. The test rejects the null at the 3% level of signi…cance, indicating that beta is indeed signi…cantly higher in Regime 1 than in Regime 2. Speci…cally, in the high return and low volatility regime, the high positive At-Risk capital portfolio has higher beta than the high negative At-Risk capital portfolio. The opposite is true in the absolute value sense in the low return and high volatility regime. Collectively, the estimates from the regime-switching model echo our earlier …ndings, and support our proposed mechanism that global funds facing signi…cant out ‡ows constitute an important transmission mechanism for shocks across borders.
Conclusion
Using new data from Emerging Portfolio Flow Research (EPFR) on the capital ‡ows to and allocations of global investment managers, we demonstrate that the forced reallocation mechanism …rst identi…ed by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) has important implications for the debate surrounding contagion. In particular, we …nd that global investment managers in …nancial distress constitute an important transmission channel for …nancial shocks between developed markets and emerging markets. We document both the forced trading behavior of those globally-focused funds that face signi…cant capital ‡ows and the implications of their actions for price determination in the emerging markets in which they are invested.
Speci…cally, we …nd that funds facing signi…cant out ‡ows reduce or eliminate their holdings in approximately 78% of the markets in which they invest, whereas funds facing in ‡ows reduce or eliminate just 21% of their positions. Similarly, funds facing sizeable in ‡ows expand their holdings in 79% of their positions, while those experiencing sizeable out ‡ows expand just 22% of their positions.
Using our measure of managed capital 'At-Risk', capturing the amount of capital that a particular emerging market could see enter or exit as a result of the in ‡ows and out ‡ows faced by invested funds, we also …nd that the emerging markets in the top quintile of At-Risk signi…cantly outperform 13 This is a result of the persistence of the regimes which are identi…ed using Bayesian inference using past and current data. As shown, the regime probabilities do not coincide perfectly with periods of positive or negative returns. In particular, negative (positive) return months that occur during a long span of positive (negative) returns are often identi…ed as still being in the high return and low volatility (low return and high volatility) regime. those in the bottom quintile. In other words, ‡ows into and out of globally focused mutual and hedge funds force them to engage in …re sales which in turn generate signi…cant price pressure in the emerging markets in which they are heavily invested. Finally, we …nd that periods during which global funds are facing pressure to reallocate their emerging markets investments are also associated with elevated correlations between equity returns in emerging and developed markets.
Taken together, we conclude that an understanding of the international contagion e¤ect requires an appreciation for the role played by forced reallocation among global funds facing funding shocks. Table I  Summary Statistics by Country  This table provides descriptive information regarding the EPFR sample, summarized by country in which the funds invest. The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008. Only emerging countries (excluding Zimbabwe) under MSCI classification are included. The number of funds is the total number of unique funds that invest in the country at any point in time during the sample period. Holding is measured as the total dollar holding in the country of all funds in the EPFR data in a particular month, divided by the country's latest year-end market capitalization. Time-series averages and standard deviations are reported. For each country-month, active change in holding is the change in dollar holding net of the country index return in the month, divided by the country's latest year-end market capitalization. Time-series correlations between active change in holding and country index return are reported. Average correlations are calculated using the pooled sample (including all country-months). 
Table II Fund Summary Statistics
This table provides descriptive information regarding the funds in the EPFR sample. Only funds that invest in emerging countries at any point during the sample period are included. The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008. The statistics are pooled across fund-months, except for the crosssectional statistics on alphas. Total net assets (TNA) are the total asset value in U.S. dollar at the end of each month. Number of countries invested is the total number of countries, including both developed and emerging countries, in which the fund has non-zero allocation. Allocation to each country and cash holding are measured as a percentage of TNA. Month-to-month change in cash holding, fund flows, and fund returns are measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA. Alphas are measured as an intercept from the time-series regression of each fund returns on the MSCI world market returns for the World CAPM or on the world market returns, SMB, HML, and UMD for the Fama-French four-factor model. Alphas are estimated only for funds that exist for at least 12 months. This table reports This table reports This table reports This table reports results from time-series regressions of calendar-time portfolio returns on world risk premium. The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008. The frequency is monthly. Each month, the portfolio is formed by going long an equally-weighted portfolio of countries in quintile 1 and going short those in quintile 5. Countries are sorted into quintiles on the basis of actual At-Risk (first two columns) and predicted At-Risk (last two columns) as a percentage of country market capitalization. Predicted At-Risk is calculated by replacing the current month flow by the expected flows, estimated via Fama-MacBeth regressions of fund flows on lagged flows and returns. In Panel A, the world market premium is measured as return on MSCI world index minus one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Positive (negative) world dummy equals one if the world risk premium is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. In Panel B, the G7 risk premium is measured as return on MSCI G7 index minus one-month Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate. Positive (negative) G7 dummy equals one if the G7 risk premium is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. The number of monthly observations is denoted by N, and Newey-West standard errors using three lags are in parentheses. This table reports results from time-series regressions of calendar-time portfolio returns on the world risk premium. The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008. The frequency is monthly. Each month, the portfolio is formed by going long an equally-weighted portfolio of countries in quintile 1 and going short those in quintile 5: Countries are sorted into quintiles based on the beginning-of-month holding in the country of all sample funds, measured as a percentage of the country market capitalization. World market premium is measured as the return on the MSCI world index minus one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Positive (negative) world dummy equals one if the world risk premium is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. The number of monthly observations is denoted by N, and Newey-West standard errors using three lags are in parentheses. 
Table III Predictive Regressions for Fund Flows

Table XI Regime-Switching Model Estimation
This table reports parameter estimates of a regime switching model of calendar-time long-short portfolio returns. The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008. The frequency is monthly. Each month, the portfolio is formed by going long an equally-weighted portfolio of countries in At-Risk quintile 1 and going short those in At-Risk quintile 5. World market premium is measured as the return on MSCI world index minus the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Parameters are estimated by two-step maximum likelihood. In the first step, parameters of the regime-switching model for the world risk premium are estimated. The estimated regime probabilities are then used to estimate parameters of the regime-switching market model for the calendar-time portfolio returns. Standard errors are calculated based on the outer product of the score of the likelihood function. The Chi-squared statistic is based on the Wald test of the hypothesis that loadings on the world risk premium are the same across the two regimes. 
